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ABSTRACT
New Mexico statute Section 30-2-4 makes assisted suicide a fourth
degree felony. In Morris v. Brandenburg, Dr. Katherine Morris,
Dr. Aroop Mangalik and cancer patient Aja Riggs challenged the
statute in court, alleging that the statute (i) does not apply to
physician-assisted suicide due to its specific language and, (ii) if
it does, it is unconstitutional under two provisions of New
Mexico’s Constitution. On January 31, 2014, the district court
held physician-assisted suicide to be a fundamental liberty
interest, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed on August
11, 2015. The New Mexico Supreme Court decided on June 30,
2016, that there is no right to physician-assisted suicide under
New Mexico’s Constitution. As of January 2018, six
jurisdictions—Washington, Oregon, Vermont, California,
Colorado, and District of Columbia—statutorily permit physicianassisted suicide, and Montana permits it only as a statutory
defense to homicide. The remaining states prohibit the practice
through manslaughter statutes, similar to New Mexico’s Section
30-2-4.
This Article explores whether there is support for a finding of a
right to physician-assisted suicide under New Mexico’s
Constitution, which is arguably more expansive in its coverage of
due process rights and liberties than the Constitution of the United
States. In 1997 in Washington v. Glucksberg, the United States
Supreme Court held that there is no right to physician-assisted
suicide under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
However, New Mexico courts are not definitively bound by federal
precedent. Under an interstitial approach, federal case law can be
instructive, but New Mexico courts may depart from federal
precedent under specific circumstances. This Article first
examines the existing state and national environments and their
respective support for the practice of physician-assisted suicide,
as well as the Morris case from trial through appeal. Next, this
* Associate Attorney at Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. and graduate of University of
New Mexico School of Law.
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Article engages in an analysis of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
decision in Morris, and the legal avenues left unexplored. Finally,
this Article argues that the New Mexico Supreme Court should
have analyzed the existence of a right to physician-assisted suicide
under New Mexico’s due process clause, as supplemented and
expanded by New Mexico’s inherent rights clause.
Constitutional protections, as well as society’s constructions of
rights and liberties, are not fully static; rather, they are somewhat
mobile with changing values and time. When the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected a finding of a right to physician-assisted suicide in
1997, they did so without the backdrop of a functional practice.
Today, physician-assisted suicide is legally practiced in seven
jurisdictions, and during the past two decades, an exhaustive
record and a detailed standard of care has developed in the
medical community. New Mexico’s more expansive Constitution
could provide protection for a decision that is intricately intimate
and which belongs in the private realm of the individual and his
or her physician.
INTRODUCTION
When a terminally ill patient reaches a point of intolerable pain, discomfort
and a loss of dignity, is it legally permissible for him or her to consciously opt for
physician-assisted suicide? In most of the United States, the answer is no, but in the
state of New Mexico the question was recently challenged anew in courts. Without
specifically referencing physicians, New Mexico statute Section 30-2-4 makes any
assisted suicide a fourth degree felony and defines assisted suicide as “deliberately
aiding another in the taking of his own life.”1 Physician assisted suicide is authorized
by statute in Vermont, Oregon, California, Washington, Colorado, and the District
of Columbia, and it is a valid statutory defense to homicide in Montana.2 In the
remaining jurisdictions, physician-assisted suicide is potentially prohibited by
blanket manslaughter statutes similar to New Mexico’s Section 30-2-4.3
In a challenge to Section 30-2-4’s meaning and constitutionality, Dr.
Katherine Morris, Dr. Aroop Mangalik, and Aja Riggs alleged that the statute (i)
does not apply to physician-assisted suicide4 due to its specific language, and if it

1. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (West 2016).
2. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–444.12 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-48101 to -123 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01 to -661.17 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2017);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5293 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.10–.904 (2009); Baxter v.
Montana, 2009 MT 449, ¶ 50, 224 P.3d 1211.
3. See Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 3, 356 P.3d 564 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 401
(1905)).
4. The term “aid in dying” is used by the plaintiffs in Morris to distinguish the practice from the act
of suicide. To avoid confusion, this article will use the standard term “physician-assisted suicide,” which
was used by the United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The
use of this term does not indicate the author’s specific preference for it; the author is aware of the medical
community’s increased efforts to eradicate this term in medical journals, but the term is used in this article
to avoid confusion with other “right to die” terms.

Symposium 2018 PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE IN NEW MEXICO

235

does, (ii) it is unconstitutional under two provisions of New Mexico’s Constitution.
The Second Judicial District Court of New Mexico held that Section 30-2-4 prohibits
physician-assisted suicide and that it is unconstitutional under Article II, Section 4
and Article II, Section 185 of New Mexico’s Constitution.6 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals reversed and held that (i) physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest under New Mexico’s Constitution, as it is contrary to New Mexico’s
constitutional protection of life,7 (ii) applies only to a specific class of citizens,8 and
(iii) is contrary to standing federal precedent. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion, determined that there is no important or fundamental right to
physician-assisted suicide under either Section 4 or Section 18 of New Mexico’s
Constitution.9 Although the New Mexico Supreme Court engaged in a full analysis
under Section 4 and Section 18 as independent clauses, it mentioned, without
analyzing, that Section 4 may be used to expand the due process protections of
Section 18.10
Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Consitution mirrors the federal
due process clause closely, while Article II, Section 4 is an inherent rights clause
with no federal analogue. Arguably, Section 4 could provide a basis for broader
constitutional protections than those provided by the U.S. Constitution, but New
Mexico courts have been careful to limit the provision’s scope. The Morris decision
relied on the analogous federal case, Washington v. Glucksberg,11 which evaluated
the constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide on due process grounds, and which
foreclosed a right to physician-assisted suicide under the U.S. Constitution. In
Morris, the New Mexico Supreme Court could have departed from federal precedent
under an interstitial approach by using Section 4, by itself, or Section 4 as an
extension of Section 18. Instead, the New Mexico Supreme Court adhered to the
Glucksberg decision, finding that there was no right to physician-assisted suicide
under Section 4 as an independent clause, and that Section 18 did not provide the
distinct state characteristic required to depart from federal precedent.12
This Article first closely examines the existing state and federal
environment with respect to the legality and acceptance of physician-assisted

5. As will be described in detail in the proceeding Background section, Article II, Section 4 is New
Mexico’s Inherent Rights Clause (“All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.”), and Article II,
Section 18 is New Mexico’s Due Process Clause (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights
under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person.”).
6. Morris v. Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV-2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672977 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 31, 2014).
7. Morris, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 39 (“We decline to recognize Article II, Section 4 as protecting a
fundamental interest in hastening another person’s death because such an interest is diametrically opposed
to the express interest in protecting life.”) (internal quotations omitted).
8. Both the majority and concurring opinions emphasized the concern that the right would apply
only to some New Mexicans. See id. ¶¶ 44, 64.
9. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836.
10. Id. ¶ 51.
11. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
12. Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 38, 51, 58.
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suicide, including the support, education and safeguards that have developed in the
medical community and in society as a whole—in New Mexico and in the United
States—which are increasingly supportive of physician-assisted suicide as a practice
and as a legal concept. Second, this Article discusses the Morris v. Brandenburg
case, from trial through appeal, in extensive detail. Third, this Article examines
whether Article II, Section 4 or Article II, Section 18 of New Mexico’s Constitution
can be used to depart from federal precedent, and thus to protect a terminally ill
patient’s right to physician-assisted suicide. Finally, this Article discusses the legal
avenue left unexplored by the New Mexico Supreme Court, and argues that Section
4 and Section 18 could be used in conjunction to expand New Mexico’s due process
protections.
The terminally ill patients described by the physicians in Morris reach
points of exhaustion, excruciating pain, and loss of dignity. Many yearn to have some
control over the way in which their last moments are spent, and they wish to have
autonomy and dignity during the last stretch of their lives. While withholding lifesustaining care is legal in New Mexico,13 physician-assisted suicide with prescribed
medication is not. Not all New Mexicans are faced with or affected by the
desperation and difficulty of a terminal illness; however, all New Mexicans face the
possibility of either having a terminal illness or of knowing a loved friend or family
member that is terminally ill. The question of the legal permissibility of physicianassisted suicide is not only of great importance for New Mexicans; it is of emerging
importance and significance around the United States.
BACKGROUND
I.

PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: THE CURRENT NATIONAL
LANDSCAPE

As states across the country begin to adopt statutory schemes, or statutory
defenses, that permit the practice of physician-assisted suicide, the national
landscape is increasingly divided. There is no recognized right to physician-assisted
suicide under the United States Constitution, and while some state constitutions
provide more expansive individual rights protections, physician-assisted suicide has
not been declared a fundamental right by any superior state court. In order to
understand the holdings of Morris v. Brandenburg, it is important to understand the
full state and national context in which the case emerged.
A.

New Mexico’s Landscape: Assisted Suicide Statute, Relevant
Constitutional Provisions, and History of Respect for Patient Autonomy
a.

Section 30-2-4: New Mexico’s General Prohibition on Assisted
Suicide

New Mexico joins a majority of states that either expressly prohibit
physician-assisted suicide14 or prohibit physician-assisted suicide “by blanket
13. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
14. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-106 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §16-5-5(b), (d) (2012); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-4017 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (2017).
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manslaughter statutes.”15 New Mexico statute Section 30-2-4, enacted in 1963,
makes assisting suicide a fourth degree felony and describes assisted suicide as
“deliberately aiding another in the taking of his own life.”16 Whether the statute’s
general prohibition on assisted suicide applies to physician-assisted suicide was a
preliminary question in Morris v. Brandenburg. Notably, while New Mexico law
prohibits assisted suicide generally, New Mexico law allows a mentally competent
patient to opt for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.17
b.

New Mexico’s Constitution: Due Process and the Inherent Rights
Clause

The state constitutional provisions in question in Morris v. Brandenburg
were Article II, Section 18 and Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution.
Section 18—which is analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution—provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws.”18 Section 18 has language that expands on its federal analogue, stating that
“[e]quality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any
person.”19 This specific textual difference identifying gender equality, along with the
amendment’s history, was critical to a finding of broader state constitutional
protections for abortion funding.20
Article II, Section 4—New Mexico’s inherent rights clause—states that
“[a]ll persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable
rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety
and happiness.”21 The inherent-rights guarantee has no enumerated federal
constitutional analogue.22 New Mexico courts have not interpreted Section 4 to
provide constitutional protections beyond the due process protections existing under
federal law. While parties have argued broader state protections under Section 4,
New Mexico courts have rarely elaborated on nor found expansive constitutional
protections under this provision.23 Until Morris v. Brandenburg, Section 4 and its
scope had been “sparsely interpreted.”24 The provision’s interpretation was limited
15. See Morris, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 3 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (1905)).
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (West 2016).
17. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
18. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
19. Id.
20. See New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 31, 975 P.2d 841.
21. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4.
22. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 21, 356 P.3d 564.
23. See NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 (“It is unnecessary for us to reach the broader questions raised
by [the Article II, Section 4] argument . . . because we decide this appeal based upon the Department’s
violation of the Equal Rights Amendment to Article II, Section 18 of our state constitution.”); State v.
Madalena, 1995-NMCA-122, 908 P.2d 756 (finding no support in the language of Article II, Section 4
nor in defendant’s argument for broader protections in the context of search and seizure; moving straight
into an in depth Article II, Section 10 analysis); Browning v. Melton, No. 29,919, mem. op. at 3 (N.M.
Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2010).
24. Morris, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 39 (citing Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 105, 947
P.2d 86, rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, 524 U.S. 151 (1998)); see also Lucero v. Salazar, 1994-NMCA-
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to a recognition of some expansive language25 and to an instruction of being “mindful
of the more intimate relationship existing between a state government and its people,
as well as the more expansive roles states traditionally have played in keeping and
maintaining the peace within their borders” when engaging in its interpretation.26
Vague references to safety or happiness under Section 4 have been held insufficient
for valid claims.27
c.

Support for Physical Autonomy in New Mexico
i.

New Mexico Legislative Actions Relating to Patient Autonomy.

The plaintiffs in Morris suggested that New Mexico “has a long,
extraordinary history of respecting patient autonomy and dignity at the end of life.”28
New Mexico’s first legislative recognition of patient autonomy arose through the
Right to Die Act in 1977.29 Through the Act, New Mexico became one of the first
three states to recognize advance directives in any form.30 The Right to Die Act
allowed individuals suffering from a terminal illness or an irreversible coma to direct
that medical treatment not be used to prolong their lives.31 An “adult of sound mind
could execute a document” in advance with the directive that life-sustaining
treatment not be used if they were to be certified under the Act.32 To be certified as
terminally ill or being in an irreversible coma, the Act required written confirmation
by two physicians—one being the patient’s treating physician—that the patient was
in fact in an irreversible coma or terminally ill.33 For an incompetent person who had
not executed a document in advance, the Act allowed removal of care “when all
family members who [could] be contacted through reasonable diligence agree[d] in
good faith that the patient, if competent, would [have] choose[n] to forego that
treatment.”34 There are no reported judicial decisions under the Right to Die Act of
1977.35
The Right to Die Act was repealed in 1997 and replaced by the Uniform
Health-Care Decisions Act,36 which provides “broader coverage and less
066, ¶ 6, 877 P.2d 1106 (“The scope of the right to enjoy life and pursue happiness stated in Article II,
Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution . . . has not been determined.”).
25. See California First Bank v. State, 1990-NMSC-106, ¶ 44, 801 P.2d 646 (“Unlike the language
of the fourteenth amendment, however, Article II, Section 4 expressly guarantees the right ‘of seeking
and obtaining safety.’”).
26. Id.; see also Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 105.
27. See Blea v. City of Espanola, 1994-NMCA-008, ¶ 20, 870 P.2d 755 (discussing Article II, Section
4 and the Tort Claims Act).
28. Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief at 33, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836,
No. S-1-SC-35478.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -11 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
30. See Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief, supra note 28, at 34.
31. Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 1999-NMCA-122, ¶ 7, 989 P.2d
890.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting § 24-7-8.1(A)).
35. Id.
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to 24-7A-18 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
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formality.”37 Unlike the Right to Die Act, the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
(UHCD Act) applies to all healthcare decisions and is not limited to patients who are
terminally ill or in an irreversible coma.38 The UHCD Act in New Mexico closely
follows its national counterpart of the same name. The national Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act (the Uniform Act) was approved in 1983 by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,39 and New Mexico was the first state to
adopt the Uniform Act.40
The UHCD Act states that an adult or emancipated minor “has the right to
make his or her own health-care decisions”41 and allows an individual to give an
“advance health-care directive, which is an [oral or written] individual instruction or
a power of attorney for health care.”42 The UHCD Act allows for the withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment43 and for the patient’s acceptance
or rejection of “programs of medication.”44 All health care decisions are subject to a
patient’s capacity; the statute’s provisions otherwise equally apply to an incompetent
patient’s or a minor’s surrogate, agent or legal guardian.45 The statute “does not
authorize mercy killing, assisted suicide, euthanasia or the provision, withholding or
withdrawal of health care, to the extent prohibited by other statutes of this state.”46
Death resulting from withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining care in accordance
with the UHCD Act does not constitute suicide.47
New Mexico’s adoption of the UCHD Act was followed by its adoption of
the Pain Relief Act48 in 1999, which allows a patient to seek adequate pain relief and
protects health care providers who prescribe, dispense or administer the medical
treatment from disciplinary board action or criminal prosecution, so long as the
actions are within the governing guidelines and standards of practice.49 The New
Mexico Legislature has also recognized physical autonomy in specific areas of health
care, including family planning,50 mental health,51 and sterilization.52 While these
statutory pronouncements do not concern the withdrawal of treatment, they
nevertheless reflect New Mexico’s respect for physical autonomy and patient
decision-making, including for those who are terminally ill.

37. Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc., 1999-NMCA-122, ¶ 8.
38. Id. ¶ 15.
39. Id. ¶ 6.
40. Id.
41. § 24-7A-2.
42. Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc., 1999-NMCA-122, ¶ 8 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting § 247A-1A).
43. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1, 4, 6.1 ((West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
44. Id. § 24-7A-1.
45. See id. § 24-7A-11; see also id. §§ 24-7A-5, -6.
46. Id. § 24-7A-13(C).
47. Id. § 24-7A-13(B)(1).
48. Id. § 24-2D-1 to 6.
49. Id. § 24-2D-3.
50. Id. § 24-8-3 (stating that family planning is “recognized nationally and internationally as a
universal human right”).
51. Id. § 24-7B-4.
52. Id. § 24-9-1.
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New Mexico Health Care Organizations’ Support for
Physician Assisted Suicide

With respect to assisted suicide by physician-prescribed medication,
various New Mexico health care organizations have expressed support for a finding
of a right to physician-assisted suicide. Such support demonstrates a local
environment that is friendly towards and prepared for the practice’s availability. The
American Medical Women’s Association, the American Medical Student
Association and the New Mexico Public Health Association jointly filed an amicus
brief with the New Mexico Court of Appeals in support of the plaintiffs in Morris.53
The organizations noted the positive effects of physician-assisted suicide in states
where it is lawful, such as a higher quality of symptom control and preparedness for
death experienced by patients, an improvement of end-of-life care overall, and
increased feelings of acceptance by family members.54 The organizations also
discussed the growing trend of medical professional and public health organizations
to support physician-assisted suicide.55 The New Mexico Psychological Association
also expressed support for the plaintiffs, noting that as “the largest organization of
professional doctorate-level psychologists in New Mexico,” they had unanimous
support for the availability of physician-assisted suicide and a unanimous
understanding that death with a physician’s assistance was fundamentally different
from suicide.56 The New Mexico Chapter of the ALS Association expressed support
for the Plaintiffs-Petitioners, stating that ALS patients suffer a particularly
“torturous” end of life and are the second most common group—after cancer
patients—to request physician-assisted suicide in the states where it is legally
permissible.57 New Mexico’s ALS Association Chapter stated that physicianassisted suicide is a private and intimate decision, which should be protected from
the state.58
In contrast, the Christian Medical and Dental Associations joined five New
Mexico Senators and six New Mexico Representatives in an amicus brief in support
of the State.59 The brief expressed the Christian Medical and Dental Associations’
interest “in affirming the medical profession as a healing profession with the duty to
‘do no harm.’”60 The brief expressed a concern for vulnerable groups—including
concern for the abuse of elder adults, the exploitation of persons with disabilities,

53. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Medical Women’s Association, American Medical Student
Association and New Mexico Public Health Association, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356
P.3d 564 (No. 33,630).
54. Id. at 6–11.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Brief of Amicus New Mexico Psychological Association in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees
at 1–4, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564 (No. 33,630).
57. Amicus Curiae Brief of the ALS Association New Mexico Chapter in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees at 1, 4, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564 (No. 33,630).
58. Id. at 5.
59. Brief of Amici Curiae: State of New Mexico Senators Mark Moores, Stephen P. Neville, and
William E. Sharer; New Mexico State Representatives David M. Gallegos, Jason C. Harper, Yvette
Herrell, and James R.J. Strickler; and Christian Medical and Dental Associations, Morris v. Brandenburg,
2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564 (No. 33,630).
60. Id. at 5.
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and situations involving patients with depression61—and argued that policy
questions should be left with the legislature.62 The American Association of People
with Disabilities, ADAPT, Not Dead Yet, the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, the
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, the National Council on Independent
Living, and the United Spinal Association also expressed a concern for the
implications of physician-assisted suicide on vulnerable individuals.63
B.

Support for Physician Assisted Suicide in Other States

Physician assisted suicide has become legal in certain states through the
legislative process. California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Oregon,
Washington, and Vermont currently allow physician-assisted suicide for mentally
competent, terminally ill patients.64 In Montana, physician-assisted suicide is
recognized as a valid statutory defense to homicide.65
a.

Oregon

Oregon was the first state in the United States to make physician-assisted
suicide legally permissible, and has since established a comprehensive record of the
practice. Oregon enacted the Death With Dignity Act (“ODWDA”)66 in 1997, which
legally permits the practice of physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill, mentally
competent patients. The plaintiffs in Morris presented a lengthy record at the district
court bench trial—the first trial record in the nation to compile, transcribe and
evaluate the existing practice of physician-assisted suicide as a whole.67 The trial
record included the testimony of three physicians who had practiced end-of-life care
in Oregon, and who had prescribed physician-assisted suicide medication to various
patients, or evaluated patients for their qualification for physician-assisted suicide,
61. Id. at 24–33
62. Id. at 39–44.
63. Amicus Brief of Disability Rights Amici: Not Dead Yet, ADAPT, American Association of
People with Disabilities, Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund,
National Council on Independent Living, and the United Spinal Association at 7–11, Morris v.
Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564 (No. 33,630).
64. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–444.12 (West 2015) (allowing a terminally ill,
mentally competent, resident of California to voluntarily request and self-administer an “aid-in-dying”
drug); COLO. REV. STAT §§ 25-48-101–123 (2016) (allowing a terminally ill, mentally competent adult to
receive aid-in-dying medication if the request is not due to age or disability); D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01–.16
(2017) (allowing an adult of “sound mind” who is terminally ill and fully aware of his or her diagnosis to
request medication that will end his or her life “in a humane and peaceful manner”); OR. REV. STAT. §§
127.800–.897 (2017) (allowing a capable adult who is informed and terminally ill to make a written
request for medication to terminate his or her life); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5292 (2013) (allowing
physicians, without civil or criminal consequences, to prescribe self-administered medication to hasten
the death of a terminally ill patient upon his or her oral and written request); WASH. REV. CODE §§
70.245.10–.904 (2009) (allowing a competent and terminally ill adult to make a written request for
medication to terminate his or her life).
65. See Baxter v. Montana, 2009 MT 449, ¶ 50, 224 P.3d 1211 (“[A] terminally ill patient’s consent
to physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of homicide against the aiding
physician when no other consent exceptions apply. . . . ”).
66. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.897 (2017).
67. Interview with Laura Schauer Ives, Partner, Kennedy, Kennedy, & Ives, in Albuquerque, NM
(Oct. 21, 2017).
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within the parameters of ODWDA.68 The physicians described their experience with
patients in terminal stages of illness in great detail, the physician-assisted suicide
methods of practice and the standard of care as established by Oregon and as used in
other states where physician-assisted suicide is permitted, their practice and
familiarity with palliative sedation and withdrawal of care, Oregon’s
comprehensively compiled data, and the overall positive experience that patients and
their families have when physician-assisted suicide is an available option.69
Accordingly, there is currently ample evidence that Oregon, in being the
first state to legally permit physician-assisted suicide twenty years ago, has been a
leader in the practice of physician-assisted suicide with respect to the standard of
care and guidelines, the medical and psychiatric research, and physician-to-physician
education. Oregon’s data, which has been compiled since its practice of physicianassisted suicide began in 1997, shows that 1,967 people received prescriptions under
ODWDA between 1997 and 2017, and that 1,275 of those patients died from
ingesting the medication.70 At the time of the Morris trial, 1,050 patients had
requested physician-assisted suicide under ODWDA and received the medication.
Of the 1,050 patients, only 700 ingested the medication, resulting in an ingestion
percentage of about sixty-seven percent.71
b.

Montana

Similar to New Mexico, Montana has a homicide statute effectively
prohibiting assisted suicide.72 In 2009, the Montana Supreme Court evaluated the
statute’s constitutionality and the plaintiffs’ claims that a right to die with dignity
existed under Article II, Section 4 and Article II, Section 10 of the Montana
Constitution.73 Article II, Section 4, of Montana’s Constitution is an individual
dignity provision which provides: “The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.”74 Article II, Section 10, of
Montana’s Constitution is a right of privacy provision which provides: “The right of
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest.” 75 The court did not engage in
an analysis of whether there was a constitutionally protected right to die with
dignity—instead, the court resolved the issue from a statutory standpoint.

68. See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, Morris v. Brandenberg, 2014 WL 10672986 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. D-202-CV-2012-02909) [hereinafter Transcript of Record, Vol. 2]; Transcript of
Record, Vol. 3, Morris v. Brandenberg, 2014 WL 10672986 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 2014) (No.
D-202-CV-2012-02909) [hereinafter Transcript of Record, Vol. 3].
69. See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68, at 1–192 and Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra
note 68, at 1–70.
70. See OR. HEALTH AUTHORITY, OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 2017 DATA SUMMARY 5
(2018), http://www.oregon.gov/OHA/PH/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDign
ityAct/pages/index.aspx; see also Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note 68, at 44.
71. Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note 68, at 44.
72. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013).
73. See Baxter v. Montana, 2009-MT-449, ¶ 6, 224 P.3d 1211.
74. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
75. Id. § 10.
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The court found that Montana’s Rights for the Terminally Ill Act,76
dictating procedures for withdrawal of care and patient choices, indicated
“legislative respect for a patient’s autonomous right to decide if and how he will
receive medical treatment at the end of his life” and that the Act “explicitly shields
physicians from liability for acting in accordance with a patient’s end-of-life
wishes.”77 With respect to physician-assisted suicide, the court held that patient
consent was a valid statutory defense to a charge of homicide against the aiding
physician.78
Although the discussion of a fundamental right was not reached, the court
made statements that indicated support for the practice of physician-assisted suicide.
Notably, it stated that in physician suicide, “it is the patient—not the physician—
[who] commits the final death-causing act by self-administering a lethal dose of
medicine.”79 While Montana’s Supreme Court decision does not provide guidance
for the analysis of physician-assisted suicide under a state constitution, it
demonstrates court-ordered approval of the practice. Furthermore, Montana is an
example of a state that has fully adopted Oregon’s standard of care in the practice of
physician-assisted suicide, since it does not have a statutory scheme of its own
outlining the practice’s standards.
c.

Other States and the Shift Toward Acceptance

The state of Washington passed legislation permitting physician-assisted
suicide in 2009,80 Vermont did so in 2013,81 and California followed in 2015. 82
Colorado and the District of Columbia became the fifth and sixth jurisdictions to
pursue a legislative avenue, passing statutes in 2016 and 2017 respectively.83 Like
the statute in Oregon, all enacted physician-assisted suicide statutes require that
patients be classified as terminally ill by a physician, be mentally competent, and
request and administer the medication themselves.84
There was a significant gap in time between Oregon’s adoption of ODWDA
in 1997 and Washington’s adoption of a similar statute in 2009. Since ODWDA’s
enactment, Oregon has compiled extensive data on every single patient who has been
prescribed physician-assisted suicide medication.85 This compilation of data enabled
Oregon physicians to track and develop an effective standard of care, and helped
prompt the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in other states, as well as the
education of physicians in those states.86 It is likely that with a body of data, research,
and knowledge that continues to expand, more states will opt to legalize physician76. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -505.
77. Baxter, 2009-MT-449, ¶ 50.
78. Id.
79. Id. ¶ 49.
80. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.10–.904 (2009).
81. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5293 (2013).
82. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–444.12 (West 2015).
83. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-48-101 to -123 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01–.17 (2017).
84. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2 (West 2015).
85. See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68, at 164 (testimony of Dr. Eric Kress describing
Oregon’s gradual accumulation of a “body of knowledge, a database of . . . patients.”).
86. See id.
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assisted suicide by statutory means, using Oregon’s experience as the backbone for
a thoroughly developed standard of care. To date, however, there has been no
recognition of physician-assisted suicide as a fundamental right under any state
constitutions.
C.

The Federal Landscape: Glucksberg and the Right to Privacy

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a right to refuse unwanted lifesustaining medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.87 There is also broad support of a right to refuse treatment across
multiple states.88 Despite argued similarities between a passive withdrawal of care
and an active hastening of death, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted distinct
differences between the two and has refused to recognize a constitutionally protected
liberty interest and right to physician-assisted suicide.89 The attainability of
physician-assisted suicide as a medical option—as provided in California, Colorado,
the District of Columbia, Oregon, Washington, and Vermont—hinges on a patient’s
status as both competent and terminally ill.90 Similarly, the right to withdrawal of
care or refusal of medical treatment is sometimes dependent on the existence of a
terminal illness.91 Despite the similarities, under the current national context, the
right to die by withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is a recognized due process
liberty interest, while physician-assisted suicide is not.
a. Glucksberg: physician-assisted suicide not protected under federal due

87. See Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (“[T]he common law
doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to
refuse medical treatment.”).
88. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.15.380 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-67 (West
2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1852 (West 2007); Woods v. Com., 142 S.W.3d 24, 31–32 (Ky. 2004)
(“[T]he right of a competent person to forego treatment . . . derives from the common law rights of selfdetermination and informed consent . . . and in the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 2000-Ohio-47, 180, 736 N.E.2d 10, 15
(“[T]he right to refuse medical treatment is a fundamental right in our country . . . the Ohio Constitution
encompasses due process language that provides substantially the same safeguards as does the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
89. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–25 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects
the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. . . . [But] the asserted ‘right’ to
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. . . . Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct.”).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-48-101 to -123 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01–.17 (2017); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–5293 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §§
70.245.10–.904 (2009).
91. Compare In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1201 (Ill. 1990) (limiting the scope of the
right to discontinue treatment to “terminally ill” patients as defined by statute), and N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:2H-67 (West 2007) (limiting withdrawal of life sustaining treatments to a patient in terminal
condition), with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (West 2016) (not limiting withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment to patients that are terminally ill), and Delio v. Westchester Cty. Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d
677, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (finding “no practical or logical reason to limit the exercise of the right
of self-determination with respect to one’s body to terminally ill patients”).
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process
The United States Supreme Court decided in 1997 that there is no federal
right to physician-assisted suicide. Glucksberg was decided the same year that
Oregon passed its Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA).92 In Glucksberg, the U.S.
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a Washington state statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.93 The Supreme Court found that under the
U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause, there was no fundamental liberty interest in
physician-assisted suicide and that Washington’s ban on assisted suicide was at least
reasonably related to important and legitimate government interests in the
preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of vulnerable groups
and the protection of the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.94 Glucksberg
carefully distinguished Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health95—the
Supreme Court decision finding a federally protected fundamental liberty interest in
the withdrawal of life-sustaining care—by noting that forced medication is battery
and by relying on the difference between a physician actively hastening death and
passively hastening death.96 For its assertion that there was no fundamental liberty
interest in assisted suicide, the Supreme Court relied primarily on a lack of historical
support.97 Then, the majority engaged in an exhaustive review of the state’s interests,
holding that Washington had met its burden.98 Most importantly, however, the Court
ended on the following note: “Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits the debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”99
b. The right to privacy: withdrawal of care and abortion case law
Federal withdrawal of care and abortion case law provide critical guidance
given the relative novelty of a right to physician-assisted suicide as a legal concept.
Right to die by withdrawal of care cases and abortion cases have examined state
interests in protecting life, the protection of medical ethics, the protection of third
parties, and an individual’s right to self-determination and privacy.100 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized the right to refuse medical treatment and to
withdraw life-sustaining care as a “constitutionally-protected due process liberty
interest.”101 The right to withdraw life-sustaining care is grounded in constitutional
and common law sources that protect a right to privacy and an individual’s right to

92. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2017).
93. See 521 U.S. 702.
94. Id. at 728–35.
95. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
96. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
97. Id. at 727–28.
98. Id. at 728–35.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2032–
33 (1992); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
101. Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, supra note 100, at 2025 (citing
Cruzan v. Dir., Miss. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990)).
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self-determination.102 Similarly, the right possessed by women to make decisions
about abortion has been grounded in a right of privacy.103 Finally, the withdrawal of
care and abortion cases have historically relied on a balance of the individual and
state interests involved.104 Thus, existing precedent on abortion and withdrawal of
care is immensely instructive when analyzing the existence of a right to physicianassisted suicide, which is also a concept grounded in self-determination and privacy.
II. MORRIS V. BRANDENBURG: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE FROM TRIAL THROUGH APPEAL
Dr. Katherine Morris, a surgical oncologist at the University of New
Mexico Hospital, Dr. Aroop Mangalik, a physician at the University of New Mexico
Hospital, and Aja Riggs, a New Mexico resident with uterine cancer, filed a lawsuit
on March 22, 2012, against the state of New Mexico challenging the constitutionality
of New Mexico statute Section 30-2-4, which prohibits assisted suicide. The parties,
seeking recognition of a fundamental right in physician-assisted suicide for patients
that are terminally ill and mentally competent, went to trial on December 11, 2013,
at the Second Judicial District Court of New Mexico.105
The trial record was extensive and significant for the plaintiffs’ case, as it
compiled testimony from physicians, including named plaintiff Dr. Morris, who
were familiar with physician-assisted suicide in states that statutorily permit the
practice.106 On January 31, 2014, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
holding: (i) the plain language of Section 30-2-4 encompasses the practice of
physician-assisted suicide, and (ii) physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill
patients is a fundamental right under the inherent-rights guarantee of Article II,
Section 4 and the substantive due process protections afforded by Article II, Section
18 of the New Mexico Constitution.107 On August 11, 2015, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals overturned the District Court decision that physician-assisted suicide is a
protected fundamental right under New Mexico’s Constitution.108 The New Mexico
Supreme Court ruled on June 30, 2016, that physician-assisted suicide is not a
fundamental or important right under the inherent rights clause of New Mexico’s

102. Id.; see also Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (recognizing that a decision to
withdraw treatment was within the patient’s right to privacy).
103. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 839; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“We, therefore, conclude
that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision[.]”).
104. Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, supra note 100, at 2032–33; see
also Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
105. Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68, at 4.
106. The following physicians testified at trial: Dr. Nicholas Gideonse, a practicing physician in
Oregon, named plaintiff Dr. Katherine Morris, who had previously practiced in Oregon and is currently
practicing in New Mexico, Dr. David Pollack, a psychiatrist who has practiced in Oregon for forty years,
and Dr. Eric Kress, a practicing hospice physician in Montana. See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra
note 68, at 1–192; Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note 68, at 1–70.
107. See Morris v. Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV-2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672977, at 1 (N.M. 2d Jud.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 31, 2014); see also Morris v. Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV-2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672986
(N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 2014).
108. See Morris, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 54.
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Constitution, and that the statute prohibiting assisted suicide was constitutional under
the due process clause of New Mexico’s Constitution.109
A.

The Trial
a.

Testimony at trial: medical experts and personal experiences

The Morris v. Brandenburg bench trial began on December 11, 2013, in
front of the Honorable Nan G. Nash in the Second Judicial District Court of New
Mexico.110 The plaintiffs had six witnesses: Katherine Morris, M.D., Aja Riggs,
David A. Pollack, M.D., Adrienne Dare, Eric Kress, M.D., and Nicholas L.
Gideonse, M.D.111 Taken together, the witnesses’ testimony illustrated the various
challenges of end of life care, the processes and benefits of physician-assisted suicide
in different states, the distinction between suicide and physician-assisted suicide, and
the effect of physician-assisted suicide on the friends and families of patients. Scott
Fuqua, Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, cross-examined the witnesses
but did not present witnesses for the state.112
In the plaintiffs’ opening statement, attorney Laura Schauer Ives of the
ACLU of New Mexico stated “[t]his case is about choice.”113 Ms. Ives explained that
named plaintiff Aja Riggs, a New Mexico resident and uterine cancer patient,
“simply wants a choice of how much suffering she has to endure at the end of her
life.”114 Ms. Ives added that named plaintiffs Dr. Morris and Dr. Mangalik “want to
be able to provide the medically valid choice of aid in dying to competent,
terminally-ill patients if they want it.”115 The opening statement focused on the
distinction between suicide and physician-assisted suicide, and emphasized that there
is now a “well-accepted standard of care” in states that allow the practice.116 Mr.
Fuqua’s opening statement for the state of New Mexico focused on the separation of
powers and the important role of the state legislature for matters like physicianassisted suicide.117
Plaintiff Dr. Morris was the first witness to testify at trial. Dr. Morris is a
surgical oncologist who attended medical school in Oregon and practiced as an
attending surgical oncologist in Portland, Oregon, for five years prior to moving to
New Mexico.118 At the time of the trial, Dr. Morris was working at the University of
New Mexico Hospital, where she was an assistant professor in the Department of
Surgery.119 On the basis of her extensive experience with terminally ill patients, Dr.
Morris testified that the loss of autonomy at the end of a patient’s life can be rapid
109.
110.
68.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 58.
See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68; see also Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note
See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68; Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note 68.
See Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68; Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note 68.
Transcript of Record, Vol. 2, supra note 68, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 12–14.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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and extremely difficult.120 Dr. Morris described the experiences of a handful of
former terminally ill patients in excruciating detail, including a woman who had a
rotting tumor in her chest wall, and who could not eat as a consequence of the
smell.121
Because of her practice as an attending surgical oncologist in Oregon, Dr.
Morris was familiar with, and had prescribed medication under, Oregon’s
ODWDA.122 While in Oregon, Dr. Morris prescribed the medication on two
occasions.123 One of the patients, who had been declared terminally ill as a result of
her advanced liver cancer, was the subject of the documentary How to Die in
Oregon.124 Dr. Morris explained that this patient was surrounded by her family when
she took the medication, and that she took the medication “to end her suffering, not
her life.”125 Additionally, Dr. Morris noted that the patient’s death certificate listed
the terminal cancer, rather than the physician-assisted suicide medication, as the
cause of death.126
Plaintiff Aja Riggs, a New Mexico resident and uterine cancer patient, was
the second witness to testify at trial. Ms. Riggs was diagnosed with uterine cancer in
2011, and immediately underwent surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, to treat the
cancer.127 After the treatment, Ms. Riggs developed a “chemo-resistant” tumor with
a poor prognosis.128 While Ms. Riggs was undergoing additional radiation and
chemotherapy, she heard about the Morris lawsuit and joined as a plaintiff.129 Ms.
Riggs explained that while she was in treatment, she contemplated what dying in
pain, and without autonomy, might mean.130 Ms. Riggs understood, however, that
assisted suicide was illegal in New Mexico, and therefore, she “didn’t want to
implicate anyone else in what might be a crime.”131 As a result, Ms. Riggs did not
speak with anyone—loved ones or physicians—about assisted suicide until she made
the decision to join the Morris lawsuit.132
Additional medical testimony was provided by Dr. Pollack, Dr. Kress, and
Dr. Gideonse. At the time of the trial, Dr. Pollack had been a practicing psychiatrist
for forty years in Portland, Oregon and taught at the Oregon Health and Sciences
University, Center for Ethics and Healthcare.133 Specifically, Dr. Pollack taught
medical students about end of life care and ethical decisions in healthcare settings,
and published various articles about physician-assisted suicide.134 Dr. Pollack’s

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 68–69
Id. at 70–71.
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testimony centered on the evaluation of a patient’s competency under Oregon’s
ODWDA, when that patient requests medication to end their life.135 Dr. Pollack
explained that when evaluating competency, Oregon psychiatrists and physicians
seek to establish “whether the [patient] has some kind of psychiatric condition [or
external influence] that might be interfering with their judgment or contributing to
their [choice],” such that the choice to take the medication is not by the patient’s free
will.136
Dr. Kress, who, at the time of the trial, practiced end of life hospice care in
Montana, where physician-assisted suicide is permitted by statutory defense,
provided additional testimony on specific examples of the practice of physicianassisted suicide.137 In his practice, Dr. Kress provided a variety of end of life care,
including palliative sedation, withdrawal of care, and physician-assisted suicide
medication.138 Dr. Kress explained that in Montana, he was asked for end of life
medication by fifteen patients, and he prescribed it to four.139 Most importantly, Dr.
Kress testified that Oregon has developed an extensive body of knowledge, and a
database of over 600 patients who have used physician-assisted suicide
medication.140 Dr. Kress explained that because there is no statutory scheme for the
administration of physician-assisted suicide medication in Montana, its physicians
have relied extensively on the standard of care developed in Oregon.141
Finally, Dr. Gideonse, an Oregon-based family physician, testified that over
his professional career, he counseled “a couple hundred” patients on physicianassisted suicide, and prescribed the medication to forty or fifty patients.142 Dr.
Gideonse stated he was present at about twenty physician-assisted suicide deaths,
that he helped educate physicians in Vermont about physician-assisted suicide, and
that he has testified about physician-assisted suicide in front of various legislative
bodies.143 Dr. Gideonse testified about the criteria for physician-assisted suicide in
Oregon, including the declaration that a patient be terminally ill, and the requirement
that a patient be competent.144 Like Dr. Kress, Dr. Gideonse noted that Oregon’s
extensive database of patient information and codified standard of care have
provided guidelines for other states, such as Washington, Montana, and Vermont.145
b.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

The District Court’s decision: physician-assisted suicide is a

Id. at 72–86.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 159–178.
Id. at 147–49.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164–66.
Transcript of Record, Vol. 3, supra note 68, at 6–9.
Id. at 9, 11–12.
Id. at 25–28.
See id. at 29–30.

250

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48; No. 2

fundamental right in New Mexico
On January 13, 2014, Judge Nash entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law for the Morris v. Brandenburg case.146 Judge Nash found that “[s]ome
terminally ill patients find the suffering caused by their illness to be unbearable,
despite the best efforts of the medical profession to relieve their pain and other
distressing symptoms.”147 Judge Nash found that the deaths of terminally ill patients
following a withdrawal of life sustaining care, or palliative sedation, “are not
considered suicide and are not subject to prosecution under NMSA 1987, § 30-24.”148 Judge Nash found that the underlying terminal illness, rather than the removal
of life support or the administration of palliative sedation, is the cause of death in a
terminally ill patient.149 Additionally, Judge Nash found that “[a] standard of care for
physician aid in dying, informed by clinician practices and authoritative literature,
including Clinical Practice Guidelines, has developed.”150 Finally, Judge Nash found
that the benefits of physician-assisted suicide, to both the terminally ill patient and
to their loved ones, include “peaceful, dignified deaths” and improved end of life and
pain management practices.151
On January 31, 2014, Judge Nash entered a final declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction.152 Judge Nash concluded that NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-4,
New Mexico’s statute prohibiting assisted suicide, encompasses, and thus prohibits,
physician-assisted suicide.153 Additionally, Judge Nash concluded that Section 30-24 violates the New Mexico Constitution as applied to physician-assisted suicide.154
Judge Nash held that a terminally ill, mentally competent patient “has a fundamental
right to choose aid in dying pursuant to the New Mexico Constitution’s guarantee to
protect life, liberty, and seeking and obtaining happiness, [Article II, Section 4], and
its substantive due process protections, [Article II, Section 18].”155
B.

Appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals

The State of New Mexico appealed the district court decision, arguing: (i)
there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, and (ii) the district court’s
ruling “violates the doctrine of separation of powers by legalizing conduct that is
designated to be a crime by the Legislature.”156 The State argued specifically that
while end-of-life decisions generally implicate an important and fundamental right,

146. Morris v. Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672986 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 13, 2014).
147. Id. at 2.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 3.
151. See id. at 5–6.
152. Morris v. Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV-2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672977 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 31, 2014).
153. Id. at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 564, 570.
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“that right does not encompass the affirmative aid of third parties.”157 The State
asserted that the appropriate standard to apply to an evaluation of Section 30-2-4’s
constitutionality is the rational basis test, since no fundamental rights are
implicated.158 Furthermore, the State argued that the District Court “lacked a
sufficient basis” for departing from federal precedent and for finding greater
protection under New Mexico’s Constitution.159 Finally, the State alleged that the
permissibility of physician-assisted suicide is a “quintessential legislative
determination.”160
The plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal, as presented in the district court,
remained the same: the Legislature’s use of the term “suicide” in Section 30-2-4 does
not encompass the unique act of “aid in dying” (a term assigned by plaintiffs to the
practice of physician-assisted suicide), and if it does, Section 30-2-4’s
“criminalization of aid in dying” violates Article II, Section 4 and Article II, Section
18 of the New Mexico Constitution.161 The plaintiffs did not assert a right to
physician-assisted suicide under federal law; rather, they asserted that the right is
protected by New Mexico’s more expansive constitutional provisions.162
Specifically, the plaintiffs identified the implicated fundamental rights as “the right
to autonomous medical decision making” and “the right to a dignified peaceful
death.”163 The alleged liberty interest was narrowly defined by plaintiffs as
applicable only when: (i) a mentally competent, (ii) terminally ill patient (iii) requests
a prescription for medication that will end his or her life, (iv) which a “willing
physician applying the proper standard of care” determines is appropriate.164 The
plaintiffs argued that departure from existing federal physician-assisted suicide
precedent was appropriate because of New Mexico’s “distinctive state
characteristics,” and because there is presently an extensive history of the medical
practice in the United States which was not available at the time of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Glucksberg.165
On August 11, 2015, the New Mexico Court of Appeals published its
decision.166 The Court of Appeals overturned the district court decision that
physician-assisted suicide is a protected fundamental right under New Mexico’s
Constitution,167 but the decision was split by differing opinions on the appropriate
standard of constitutional review, on the issue of separation of powers, and on the
result. Judge Timothy L. Garcia wrote for the majority, Judge J. Miles Hanissee
wrote a concurrence, and Judge Linda M. Vanzi dissented.

157. Defendant-Appellant’s Brief in Chief at 3, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d
564 (No. 33,630).
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. at 9–11.
160. Id. at 18.
161. Morris, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 17, 21.
162. See id. ¶ 21.
163. Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotations omitted).
164. Id. ¶ 27.
165. Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief, supra note 28, at 31.
166. See Morris, 2015-NMCA-100.
167. Id. ¶ 54.
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With respect to the plaintiff’s statutory construction argument, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court that, as a textual matter, Section 30-2-4
encompassed and prohibited the specific practice of physician-assisted suicide.168
Moving to the constitutional analysis, the majority determined that the existing
federal precedent “provided a substantive due process answer to a factually identical
scenario that has never been rejected by any state appellate court.”169 Noting that
physician-assisted suicide is a new legal consideration, the majority stated that it
“must be weighted against longstanding societal principles,” such as the preservation
of life and the prevention of suicide.170 Holding that existing federal precedent
continues to provide New Mexico courts with “principled authority,” the majority
concluded that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide under New
Mexico’s due process provision.171 With respect to the inherent rights clause, the
majority declined to recognize Article II, Section 4 “as protecting a fundamental
interest in hastening another person’s death because such an interest is diametrically
opposed to the express interest in protecting life.”172 The majority determined that,
because no fundamental interest in physician-assisted suicide existed, the district
court should have applied an intermediate standard of constitutional review.173
Concurring in part with the majority, Judge Hanisee discussed his
agreement with the result, and his disagreement with the standard of review and
disagreement with the analysis of the issue of separation of powers. Judge Hanisee
agreed with the statutory construction of Section 30-2-4 as being inclusive of
physician-assisted suicide.174 Judge Hanisee expressed discomfort that a class of
citizens—mentally competent, terminally ill adults—would “possess a right that
would be denied to other[s].”175 Finally, Judge Hanisee noted that the legality of
physician-assisted suicide should be addressed by the legislature, and concluded that
Section 30-2-4 should be upheld under a rational basis review, which applies to
neither important nor fundamental rights.176
Judge Vanzi’s dissent expressed her disagreement with the majority and
concurring opinions with respect to the existence of a protected fundamental right in
physician-assisted suicide and therefore, with respect to the appropriate standard of
constitutional review. Judge Vanzi responded to Judge Hanisee’s discussion of a
specially-protected class by asserting that “all New Mexicans” possess the right to
physician-assisted suicide.177 Judge Vanzi stated that history is not always binding,
noting that “when new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”178
168. Id. ¶ 19 (“[S]tatutory language that is clear and unambiguous must be given effect. . . . “ (citing
V.P. Clarence Co. v. Colgate, 1993-NMSC-022, ¶ 8, 853 P.2d 722)).
169. Id. ¶ 34.
170. Id. ¶ 37.
171. Id. ¶ 38.
172. Id. ¶ 39 (internal quotations omitted).
173. See id. ¶ 52.
174. Id. ¶ 56 (Hanisee, J. concurring in part).
175. Id. ¶ 64.
176. Id. ¶¶ 56, 70.
177. Id. ¶ 73 (Vanzi, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
178. Id. ¶¶ 86–89.
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Article II, Section 18 is more expansive than its federal counterpart, Judge Vanzi
stated, and Article II, Section 4, which has no federal analogue, provides the
“distinctive characteristic” needed to depart from existing federal precedent.179 In
Judge Vanzi’s view, Article II, Section 4 “supplements and expands the liberty rights
afforded by Section 18.”180 Judge Vanzi rejected Judge Hanisee’s argument that the
issue should be left to the legislative branch, and stated that Section 30-2-4 should
be subjected to a heightened level of scrutiny.181 “The suffering of these citizens,”
Judge Vanzi concluded, “is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision . . . however dominant that vision been in the course of
our history and our culture.”182
C.

Appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court

The Morris plaintiffs appealed the Court of Appeals decision to the New
Mexico Supreme Court. Oral arguments were held on October 26, 2015, and the New
Mexico Supreme Court issued its decision on June 30, 2016.183 The New Mexico
Supreme Court held that although physician-assisted suicide “falls within the
proscription of Section 30-2-4,” physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental or
important right under New Mexico’s Constitution, and Section 30-2-4 is not
unconstitutional under a rational basis review.184
Because New Mexico’s due process clause—Article II, Section 18—is
analogous to the due process guarantees provided under the U.S. Constitution, the
New Mexico Supreme Court used an interstitial approach to evaluate whether
physician-assisted suicide was protected by New Mexico’s due process clause.185
Under an interstitial approach, if the right is not protected by the U.S. Constitution,
then the state court must determine “whether ‘flawed federal analysis, structural
differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics’
require a divergence from established federal precedent in determining whether the
New Mexico Constitution protects the right.”186 Citing Glucksberg187 for the
determination that physician-assisted suicide is not currently protected as a
fundamental right under the federal due process clause, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that it would not depart from federal precedent because the analysis in
Glucksberg was not flawed, and because there were no distinctive state
characteristics that justified departure from Glucksberg.188
With respect to New Mexico’s inherent rights clause—Article II, Section
4—which has no federal analogue, the New Mexico Supreme Court provided
extensive guidance on the meaning of the clause, and rejected the plaintiffs’
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Id. ¶ 106.
Id. ¶ 113.
Id. ¶ 147–48.
Id. ¶ 148 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836.
Id. ¶ 58.
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argument that the clause provides an independent basis on which to find a
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide.189 The Court began by examining
the history of New Mexico’s inherent rights clause, and explained that Section 4 is
not an “enforceable independent source of individual rights,” but rather an
“overarching principle which inform[s] the equal protection guarantee of our
Constitution.”190 Although the Court unmistakably concluded that Section 4, on its
own, was not a source under which to find a right to physician-assisted suicide, the
Court stated that the clause “may . . . ultimately be a source of greater due process
protections than those provided under federal law.”191
ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court should have examined whether Article II,
Section 4, as a supplement or expansion to Article II, Section 18, could have provided
a ground for departing from federal precedent, for the purpose of analyzing whether
physician-assisted suicide could be recognized as an important or fundamental right
under New Mexico’s Constitution. Although the scope of the Article II, Section 4,
inherent rights clause is narrow, the clause could provide broader, and more
expansive protections than the U.S. Constitution if used in conjunction with the due
process clause of Article II, Section 18. Additionally, New Mexico has a legislative,
medical, and social environment that supports a patient’s physical autonomy and
dignity. Palliative sedation, when a doctor induces unconsciousness (sometimes
resulting in death), and withdrawal of life-sustaining care are current alternatives to
prescribing medication to end the patient’s life; both are legally practiced in New
Mexico and across the United States. Like the right to decide to withdraw medical
treatment and the right a pregnant woman possesses, up until fetal viability, to decide
to have an abortion, requesting death-inducing medication is an intimate decision
that should be protected by the right of privacy. An appropriate standard of care, if
physician-assisted suicide had been permitted in New Mexico, would mirror that of
the state of Oregon.
I.

SUPPORT FOR PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE IS
INCREASING IN THE UNITED STATES

Physician assisted suicide has become permissible in certain states through
the legislative process. The present available legislative history in the United States
is increasingly supportive of a finding of a fundamental right or an important interest
in physician-assisted suicide. In 1997, when the United States Supreme Court found
in Glucksberg that there was no right to physician-assisted suicide under the federal
Constitution, the legal practice of physician-assisted suicide had not yet been
established. Today, the availability of data and working models in seven states
provide support that a state’s interest in the regulation of medical standards can be
preserved while a terminally ill patient’s right to privacy is simultaneously
safeguarded.

189. Id. ¶¶ 39–51.
190. Id. ¶ 49.
191. Id. ¶ 51.
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Twenty-one years ago, the Glucksberg opinion indicated that there was
room for future experimentation and reevaluation; the trial record in Morris lends
extensive and explicit support that since Glucksberg, the practice of physicianassisted suicide is gaining frequency, respect, demand and clarity. The testimony
from Dr. Morris, Dr. Kress, Dr. Gideonse, and Dr. Pollack, demonstrates that over
the last two decades, Oregon’s codified statutory scheme has provided a basis for the
development of medical guidelines and a standard of care for physician-assisted
suicide in the states that permit it.192 Physicians in the state of Montana, which does
not have a statutory scheme regulating physician-assisted suicide, have been able to
develop the practice of physician-assisted suicide with the existing Oregon standard
of care.193 Likewise, if in Morris the New Mexico Supreme Court had found a right
to physician-assisted suicide, or if it had recognized a consent defense like the
Montana court in Baxter,194 New Mexico physicians could have adopted Oregon’s
standard of care, despite the lack of a statutory scheme.
II.
A.

THE ANALYSIS UNDER NEW MEXICO’S CONSTITUTION

Federal Law Is Not Binding

An interstitial approach mandates that the court ask first whether a right is
protected under the federal Constitution.195 If the right is protected under the federal
Constitution, the state constitutional claim is not reached.196 If the right is not
protected under the federal Constitution, the state’s constitution is examined.197 Even
if a right is not protected under the federal Constitution, a state court may depart
from federal precedent for three reasons: “a flawed federal analysis, structural
differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state
characteristics.”198
Here, Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution mirrors the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. A claim under Section 18, thus,
requires a preliminary examination of the federal Constitution. It is clear, as was
determined by Glucksberg, that there is currently no federally protected right for
physician-assisted suicide under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not close the door on the matter, but the issue has not
been revisited by the Supreme Court since Glucksberg. The New Mexico Supreme
Court’s Morris opinion discussed Glucksberg at length, ultimately concluding that
“Glucksberg controls” because there is no basis upon which to diverge from the
Glucksberg precedent with respect to Section 18, as a stand-alone clause.199
Although a constitutional analysis under Article II, Section 4, standing
alone, does not require an interstitial approach because there is no federal analogue,
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the Court likewise declined to find a right to physician-assisted suicide under Section
4.200 Seeking to clarify the purpose and scope of Section 4, the Court explained that
the clause “inform[s] our understanding of New Mexico’s equal protection
guarantee,” but does not stand alone as an independent source of individual rights.201
The Court left one avenue of analysis, however, unexplored: the use of Section 4 as
a supplement or expansion to the Section 18 due process clause. After concluding
that Section 4, by itself, did not establish an important or fundamental right for
physician-assisted suicide, the Court stated unambiguously that “[Section 4] may
also ultimately be a source of greater due process protections than those provided
under federal law.”202 In other words, the Court indicated that Section 4 could be
used to expand the due process protections afforded to New Mexico citizens.
Following this statement, however, the Court did not proceed to analyze whether the
inherent rights clause, used in conjunction with the Section 18 due process clause,
could establish a right to physician-assisted suicide in New Mexico. Instead of using
the inherent rights clause’s expansive potential as the needed distinctive
characteristic to depart from the federal Glucksberg precedent, it is possible that with
the use of the word “ultimately,” the Court left the potential analysis for a future
case.203
B. Expansion of the Federal Baseline: Using Article II, Section 4, to Expand
Article II, Section 18, and As a Point of Divergence from Federal Law
In the New Mexico Court of Appeals Morris decision, Judge Vanzi wrote a
dissenting opinion that described and evaluated the option of using New Mexico’s
inherent rights clause as an expansion of its due process clause.204 Judge Vanzi stated
“it is plain that Section 4 supplements and expands the liberty rights afforded by
Section 18’s due process clause to ensure maximum protection for the lives and
liberty of New Mexicans.”205 Judge Vanzi asserted that whether taken on its own, or
as an expansion of Section 18’s due process clause, Section 4 was the “distinctive
characteristic” needed for the Court of Appeals to depart from the Glucksberg federal
precedent.206 In Judge Vanzi’s opinion, the Section 4 inherent rights clause “affords
New Mexico citizens the right and agency to defend their lives and liberty by availing
themselves of aid in dying.”207
On review, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not substantively address
Judge Vanzi’s analysis regarding the use of Section 4 and Section 18 in conjunction,
or foreclose the possibility of Section 4 as an expansion of the Section 18 due process
clause. Instead, the Supreme Court fully analyzed the right of physician-assisted
suicide under Section 4 and Section 18 as independent clauses, and then only
acknowledged the possibility that Section 4 could, in fact, expand New Mexico’s
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due process clause.208 Had the Supreme Court engaged in an analysis beyond a mere
acknowledgment, it may have reached the same conclusion as Judge Vanzi: Section
4’s expansion of Section 18’s due process clause establishes a distinctive
characteristic that allows the Court to depart from Glucksberg. Departing from
Glucksberg, the New Mexico Supreme Court could have determined that New
Mexican’s have a right to physician-assisted suicide under the New Mexico
Constitution.
Finding a right to physician-assisted suicide under an expanded due process
clause would not be a stretch under existing legal principles. The right to withdrawal
of care and to abortion before fetal viability are inherent due process liberties that
have been grounded in the right of privacy. Roe v. Wade209 and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey210 were pivotal federal abortion cases,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, which found protection of physical autonomy
under the federal Due Process Clause. Both cases recognized a right of privacy
rooted, at least in part, in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.211 The
right to withdrawal of care has similarly been recognized under a right to privacy
found in the Fourteenth Amendment. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, the Supreme Court held that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.212 The Court stated
that “the choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality.”213 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
withdrawal of life-sustaining care of a woman in a non-cognitive vegetative state
was grounded in a right to privacy in Matter of Quinlan in 1976.214 Removal of lifesustaining care has also been included within a due process right to selfdetermination.215 Finally, the most recent federal guidance on fundamental liberty
interests under the federal Due Process Clause is in the decision of Obergefell v.
Hodges.216 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court held that there is a protected
fundamental liberty interest in marrying a person of the same sex.217 The Court stated
that “history and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries.”218
Accordingly, while the New Mexico Supreme Court had an opportunity to
determine whether Section 4 expands on Section 18’s due process clause, it chose
not to do so. By affirming that Section 4 may expand New Mexico’s due process
clause, the New Mexico Supreme Court left open an avenue for future consideration.
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The legal background of due process liberties grounded in the right of privacy, such
as the rights to withdrawal of care and abortion, would help inform the inquiry of
how a right to physician-assisted suicide can fit within the parameters of New
Mexico’s due process clause.
CONCLUSION
Few things are as private and critical as a patient’s end-of-life decisions
during terminal illness. Terminal illness can subject a person to final days, weeks or
months of agonizing pain in which induced commas or extremely high—and often
ineffective—amounts of pain killers are the only available relief. Physician assisted
suicide provides a terminally ill patient control and consciousness at the end of their
lives, so that they may adequately bid farewell to their loved ones and so that they
may spend their last moments as they choose. New Mexico’s Constitution arguably
provides broader due process protections than the U.S. Constitution. New Mexico
courts are at liberty to define and proscribe the fundamental liberties and rights that
should be protected from the infringement of majorities and government. The New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed that New Mexico’s due process clause may be
expanded by the inherent rights clause. It is possible that this expansion would yield
the distinctive state characteristic necessary for New Mexico courts to depart from
existing federal physician-assisted suicide precedent.

